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LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE BRAKES
IN A BORROWED CAR
Sothoron v. West'

The defendant was driving an automobile owned by a
friend, who had allowed her to take over its control in
order to take his son for a drive. After driving a distance
of several miles the defendant's car struck that of the plaintiff in the rear. There was a very steep incline where
the accident occurred, and the defendant testified that in
negotiating the hill the brakes on the car failed to hold and
this failure caused the accident. The trial judge held for
the defendant, saying: "The question goes back to whether
[the defendant] knew or should have known whether the
car she was operating was in a defective condition, [and]
I do not find any evidence to indicate that, so as between
herself and [the plaintiff] why it just seems that the case
should be decided in favor of the defendant." This was
reversed on appeal. The opinion, after noting the fact
that the defendant offered no evidence of any inspection of
the borrowed car, ruled that the appellee was not excused
from the charge of negligence because of the fact that her
brakes suddenly failed when she had driven a number of
blocks without making the slightest test of them.
It appears that many states have statutes in force providing for certain equipment that motor vehicles should
carry. These laws vary as to their specific details.2 Maryland has such a statute regarding the condition of brakes,
found in Article 56, Section 194(I), and providing "every
motor vehicle, except trailers and side cars, while in use on
the public highways of this state shall be provided with
adequate brakes." American Jurisprudence indicates that
a failure to comply with these statutory provisions requiring good and sufficient brakes on automobiles generally
renders the owners 3 liable for injuries or damages resulting
from such failure, where the inadequacy of the brakes was
the proximate cause." Cases seem to concur in this view,
as shown by Gilmore v. Caswell,5 which decided "it is negli-

gence to operate a vehicle on the public highway without
'26 A. (2d) 16 (Md., 1942).
2 42 Corpus Juris 893, Motor Vehicles, See. 596.
3There is some doubt, as shown in a subsequent paragraph of this note,
as to whether the liability primarily is on owner or driver.
45 American Jurisprudence 643.
565 Cal. App. 299, 224 P. 249 (1924).
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brakes adequate to check the speed thereof and to stop the
vehicle as required by Motor Vehicle Law of 1923." A
similar holding that a violation of the statute was negligence was reached in Indiana in the case of Fox v. Barekman.6 This would seem to be a judicious rule for the safety
of those entitled to use our highways in view of the increasing number of cars on the road, at least in normal times.
In other states having similar statutes, there appears
to be a diversity of opinion as to whether driving a car on
the public highway with defective brakes is negligence per
se, or merely a question for the jury.' Cases under similar
statutes treating the issue as a question for the jury are
found in California, Texas, and Vermont; s however it is
worthy to note that California had earlier held such to be
negligence per se in Gilmore v. Caswell.' Cases holding
violation of the statute to be negligence per se are found in
Missouri, Oregon, Alabama, and Georgia.1" This diversity
of authority is also seen in the cases which were not decided under any similar statute regulating brakes or, at
least, where no mention is made of such a statute. Minnesota, Washington and Iowa" appear to hold the problem
to be for the jury in such absence; but New Jersey appears
to decide it is negligence per se,12 although there was an
earlier case following the former view."8 The Court of
Appeals indicated that treating failure of brakes as prima
facie negligence was "the better and more general rule".
Undoubtedly the fact that the brakes of an auto are defective is a material element in the determination of a
question of negligence in a case involving a collision with
such auto, at least where the driver knew or by the
exercise
14
of proper care should have known of the defect.
Huddy, in his Encyclopedia of Automobile Law, writes
that "generally speaking, it is the duty of one operating a
0178 Ind. 572, 99 N. E. 989 (1912).
'See
63 A. L. R. 399.
0
Phillips v. Pickwick Stages, 85 Cal. App. 571, 259 P. 968 (1927) ; Co-op.
Furniture Co. v. Surety Co., 264 S. W. 201 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924) ; Landry
v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 A. 593 (1928).
01 065 Cal. App. 299, 224 P. 249 (1924).
Plannett v. McFall, 284 S. W. 850 (Mo. App., 1926) ; Foster v. Farra,
117 Ore. 286, 243 P. 778 (1926) ; Harden, Inc., v. Harden, 29 Ala. App. 411,
197 S. 94 (1940) ; Orange Bottling Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132 S. E.

259 (1926).
"'Owens v. Iowa Co., 186 Iowa 408, 169 N. W. 388
Public Market & Del., 130 Wash. 302, 226 P. 1021 (1924)
nolly, 155 Minn. 343, 193 N. W. 590 (1923).
12 Feury v. Ice Cream Co., 2 N. J. Misc. R. 1008, 126 A.
Schreiner v. Del., L. & W. R. R., 98 N. J. L. 899, 121
,5 American Jurisprudence 643.

(1918); Kolbe v.
; Manley v. Con462 (1924).
A. 84 (1923).
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motor vehicle on the public highways to see that it is in
reasonably good condition and properly equipped, so that it
may be at all times controlled and not become a source of
danger to its occupants or to other travelers". 15 More specifically on the facts, the general rule is that one operating
a motor vehicle on the public roads must exercise reasonable care to keep the brakes on the vehicle in such condition that it may be controlled at all times. 6 They must be
capable of making emergency stops.' 7 A review of the
cases on the point seems to show that the instant case places
Maryland in accord with the holdings of most courts.
Pennsylvania has decided that a motorist is under a duty
to make a reasonable inspection of the automobile, and
only when such reasonable examination fails to disclose
defective equipment is he relieved from liability for damages arising from such defects.' 8 Most cases hold there is
a plain duty on the driver of a motor vehicle to make a
reasonable inspection of it or suffer the consequences of
any easily discernible imperfection. 9 One could hardly
claim that this is placing any undue responsibility on the
operator of a motor vehicle. Particularly is this true when
one considers the speeds which cars are capable of attaining today. Of course a driver is not to be held for any
hidden defects not shown by ordinary care and inspection."
The cases on the point do not seem to be certain as to
whether this duty of inspection lies on the owner or the
driver of the vehicle in question or on both. In some the
person held liable was the owner as well as the driver and
hence the problem was not presented.2' Some courts, including the Maryland court in the principal case, have held
the driver himself liable for his negligence in driving with
defective brakes,22 while still other jurisdictions place the
burden on the owner even though the vehicle was in the
direct control of a chauffeur or agent at the time of the
(1931) 127.
16 Dostie v. Lewiston Stone Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A. (2d) 393 (1939).
17 Ziskovsky v. Miller, 120 Neb. 255, 231 N. W. 809 (1930).
s Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 188 A. 181 (1936).
10 Peterson v. Seattle Auto Co., 149 Wash. 648, 271 P. 1001 (1928).
1042 Corpus Juris 894, Motor Vehicles, Sec. 596.
"I Foster v. Farra, 117 Ore. 286, 243 P. 778 (1926) ; Owens v. Iowa Co.,
186 Iowa 408, 169 N. W. 388 (1918) ; Ziskovsky v. Miller, 120 Neb. 255, 231
N. W. 809 (1930).
21 Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 A. 593 (1928) ; Feury v. Ice Cream
Co., 2 N. J. Misc. R. 1008, 126 A. 462 (1924) ; Gilmore v. Caswell, 65 Cal.
App. 299, 224 P. 249 (1924) ; Fox v. Barekman, 178 Ind. 572, 99 N. E. 989
(1912) ; Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 188 A. 181. (1936).
"5 HUDDY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW
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accident.2 3 It is not discernible from the cases whether
the owners in the latter group of cases were held liable
primarily for the failure to inspect the equipment and provide adequate brakes themselves, or were being charged
with their servants' negligence in failing to do so under
principles of agency or (possibly) a doctrine of vicarious
liability. It is well to note here that one who borrows a
car for use in an emergency is not required to search for
hidden defects and would not be liable for
an injury result24
ing from the existence of such a defect.
In the instant case, involving a driver's liability in a
strange car, the Maryland court seems to have asked: Did
the defendant make any inspection of this car she was
driving, and, also, would such inspection have revealed
the defective condition? Clearly, from the driver's testimony in the instant case the first was answered in the negative; and the second would seem to have been answered
from common knowledge, and was so treated by the Court.
The opinion said: "If no test is made, if the brakes are not
even tried, the driver cannot rely upon a presumption that
the machine is safe. He will not then be excused from liability for the destruction he may cause upon the public
highway because he did not know his brakes were bad."
The ease and simplicity with which a driver can determine
whether his brakes are in order makes it very reasonable
to place such duty of inspection on him, as most courts
seem to do, especially when he is driving a strange car. If
the brakes had worked adequately when reasonably tested
or used prior to their first failure, then such action would
excuse the driver from liability. However the defendant's
words "I had no use for the brakes particularly before
that; I mean no hill or incline like that," were construed
by the Court to refute any idea that she might have made
any preliminary inspection or tested the car's necessary
equipment. The Court considered this testimony to mean
that no use of the brakes had been made in the previous
driving (during which one passenger had alighted), although in the absence of the defendant's own statement it
would have been "almost inconceivable" that the brakes
22 Phillips v. Pickwick Stages, 85 Cal. App. 571, 259 P. 968
(1927);
Harden, Inc., v. Harden, 29 Ala. App. 411, 197 S. 94 (1940) ; Orange Bottling
Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132 S. E. 259 (1926) ; Kolbe v. Public Market
& Trans. Co., 130 Wash. 302, 226 P. 1021 (1924) ; Schreiner v. Del., L. & W.
R. R., 98 N. J. L. 899, 121 A. 84 (1923) ; Dostie v. Lewiston Stone Co., 136
Me. 284, 8 A. (2d) 393 (1939).
14 Guile v. Snyder, 165 Ark. 221, 263 S. W. 403 (1924) ; 42 Corpus Juris
894, Motor Vehicles, Sec. 596.
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would not have previously been used, and found adequate
or defective.
This appears to be the first case directly on the point of
liability for defective brakes in a borrowed car in Maryland
and the Court, in arriving at its holding, has established
the rule that a person driving a strange car for the first
time owes a duty to the public to use reasonable care to see
that there are no obvious defects in its mechanism which
are apt to cause injury to others. This result is probably
wise in that it helps further the purpose of the legislative
requirement that all motor vehicles be provided with adequate brakes. For, unless a rigid, expensive inspection
system were installed by the state, the provision for good
brakes would be most difficult to enforce and of little use
to the public. The rule thus supported by reason is within
the general authority of the cases decided elsewhere. It
does not place an unreasonable burden on drivers, and it is
a step in the promotion of public safety without too great
an intrusion on any private right. Its warning to all
drivers to use care should be observed.

